Safran reported FY 2025 results on February 13. LEAP engine deliveries hit 1,802, up 28% year-over-year, with a 49% acceleration in Q4.1 Free cash flow reached 3.92 billion. Guidance was raised across the board.
The market read it as an Airbus earnings preview. Airbus rose from 188 to 195 before reporting a single number of its own.2 UBS modeled 900 deliveries as Airbus’s likely 2026 guidance.3 Consensus settled between 880 and 900, with outliers at 1,000.4
The reasoning is straightforward. LEAP engines power roughly 60% of A320neo deliveries. Safran’s half of CFM International is accelerating supply. Therefore Airbus’s primary constraint is loosening. Therefore more deliveries. Therefore a credible path to Rate 75, the 75-aircraft-per-month target that underpins the long-term bull case.
This reasoning treats a record LEAP production number as an Airbus delivery number. It is not. Five competing claims fight over every LEAP engine Safran builds, and Airbus’s production system spent most of 2025 unable to convert the engines it did receive into delivered aircraft.
The duopoly
The A320neo narrowbody engine market is a duopoly. Airlines choose between CFM International’s LEAP-1A (a 50/50 joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran) and Pratt & Whitney’s PW1100G. There is no third option. Once an airline selects an engine for a fleet, it is locked in for the life of those aircraft: training, tooling, spares, maintenance contracts.
As of late 2025, 835 aircraft powered by Pratt’s geared turbofan family sat grounded globally, 720 of them A320neo-family jets, one-third of the entire GTF-powered fleet.11 The grounding stems from a manufacturing defect in powder metal turbine disks discovered in 2023 and still unresolved. Shop visits take 250 to 300 days, ten times normal.12 Pratt expects the recall to extend through the end of the decade.13
This means the competitive pressure that would normally discipline a supplier is suspended. LEAP-1As have their own durability issues: early engines had shorter-than-expected time on wing, particularly in harsh environments. Safran has produced more than 1,450 high-pressure turbine durability kits to address this, and CEO Olivier Andries said the fix is bringing intervals in line with the CFM56.1a But airlines are choosing LEAP anyway because Pratt’s problems are worse. LEAP market share on the A320neo has been climbing since the recall began. Every airline that switches adds to Safran’s order book while simultaneously adding to Airbus’s LEAP-1A supply requirements.
Pratt delivered only 1,055 large commercial turbofans in 2025, a 6% increase, while simultaneously trying to feed Airbus’s production ramp and service the recall.14 Pratt’s commercial engine chief said in February 2026 that the company is “still in dialogue” with Airbus, “locking down the next few years” of supply.13 The supply agreement is not finalized. During Airbus’s Q3 earnings call, Faury confirmed that engine shortfalls in 2025 were split “about 50/50 across the engine OEMs."15
Safran’s acceleration does nothing to address Pratt’s half of the problem. And the market share shift toward LEAP makes Airbus more dependent on CFM for every incremental aircraft.
Five claims on every engine
CFM International’s LEAP comes in three variants. The LEAP-1A powers the A320neo. The LEAP-1B is the sole engine on the Boeing 737 MAX. The LEAP-1C is the sole engine on the COMAC C919. Safran’s 1,802 is the total across all three.1 Neither Safran nor GE publishes the variant breakdown.
Claim 1: Boeing. 447 737s delivered in 2025, nearly all MAX variants.5 At two engines per aircraft: approximately 890 LEAP-1Bs before spares.
Claim 2: COMAC. 15 C919s delivered.6 Plus spare engines under contract.
Claim 3: Spare engine sales. Ryanair alone purchased 30 LEAP-1B spares in a single deal.7 Safran’s own FY 2025 investor presentation highlights a “still elevated spare engine ratio” as a key profit driver.1
Claim 4: Aftermarket. Safran projects LEAP aftermarket revenue will more than triple between 2024 and 2028.1 LEAP shop visits are growing steeply through 2030, with third-party MRO’s share rising from 10% in 2024 to 30% by 2030 and above 50% by 2040.1 The company is building capacity for 1,200 LEAP shop visits per year.10a More than 80% of LEAP rate-per-flight-hour contract margins will be recognized after 2030.1 This is not a side business. It is the center of Safran’s long-term earnings model, with propulsion margins targeted at 22 to 24% through 2028.1
Claim 5: Airbus. What remains.
After Boeing, COMAC, and the elevated spare ratio, the LEAP-1A allocation for new Airbus aircraft is roughly 900 to 950 engines, enough for 450 to 475 aircraft. But Airbus delivered 607 A320neo-family jets in 2025,8 and Pratt’s PW1100G powers approximately 40% of them. Airbus needed roughly 730 LEAP-1A engines for delivered aircraft. The surplus above that feeds the spare pools and residual glider inventory that Safran is counting on to fuel its aftermarket tripling.
This is not the 294-aircraft surplus the headline number implies. It is a modest buffer, and it is getting tighter on both sides. Boeing is ramping toward 53 737 MAXs per month by year-end 2026.9 Safran’s new Morocco LEAP-1A line does not come online until 2028.10 And every LEAP engine that enters the aftermarket instead of a new aircraft is an engine Safran profits from twice: once on the original sale, and again on maintenance. Safran’s incentives and Airbus’s incentives are not aligned.
What the engines arrive into
For most of 2025, engines were the binding constraint. Airbus said so. At the H1 results in July, Airbus reported free cash flow before customer financing of negative 1.6 billion, citing “the high level of produced commercial aircraft awaiting engines."16 Sixty engineless “gliders” sat on Airbus aprons.15
Engine supply improved in the second half. The glider count dropped to near zero by year-end.15 17 Then, on December 3, a different constraint emerged: a supplier quality issue on fuselage panels from Sofitec Aero in Seville.18 Panels with incorrect thickness. 628 aircraft requiring inspection.19 EASA issued a directive covering 177 in-service jets.20 Airbus cut guidance by approximately 30 aircraft.18
Christian Scherer, speaking January 12, said the engine volume was not the “limiting factor” by year-end.17 He also said engines for the A320neo family “continued to arrive very, very late in 2025."21 Both are true. Ten months constrained by engines, then two months constrained by fuselage panels. Solving either one surfaces the next constraint. The market treats this supply chain as if it has a single bottleneck. It does not.
The December sprint
Airbus delivered 136 aircraft in December, 17.2% of its annual total.22 Forecast International identified the mechanism: aircraft contractually delivered on December 31 to support year-end metrics were physically ferried to operators throughout January.23
January 2026: 19 deliveries.24 The lowest since the pandemic. January 2019 was 39.25 The 136 and the 19 are one event split across a calendar boundary.
December’s share has climbed every year. 2023: 15.2%. 2024: 16.1%. 2025: 17.2%.22 26 27
Airbus delivered 793 aircraft in 2025.8 Consensus for 2026 is 900. Subtract the 19 January deliveries. Eleven months remain to deliver 881, or 80.1 per month.24 In 2019, Airbus’s record year, the monthly average was 71.9.28 Reaching 900 requires sustaining a pace 11% above the all-time record for the rest of the year.
The guidance cycle is consistent. 2024: guided 800, revised to 770, delivered 766.27 2025: guided 820, revised to 790, delivered 793.8 Set high. Fall behind. Revise. Sprint.
Rate 75 has slipped from 2025 to 2026 to 2027.29 The current A320 rate is roughly 60.30 Forecast International stated in June 2025 it does not expect Rate 75 within Airbus’s projected timeline.31 Reaching it requires CFM and Pratt to deliver combined narrowbody engine output roughly 40% above current levels, while Pratt manages a recall through at least 2030, while Safran builds out an aftermarket that competes with Airbus for engine allocation, and while the quality system that missed 628 defective fuselage panels at Rate 60 somehow performs at Rate 75.
The double count
Safran trades at roughly 33x forward earnings.33 That multiple prices in accelerating OE volume, a tripling aftermarket, and 22 to 24% propulsion margins.1 It is defensible. Safran can sell every LEAP it builds: to Airbus, to Boeing, or into an aftermarket with captive customers locked in for the life of their fleets. Its execution is real.
The question is whether the market is pricing Safran’s execution into Airbus as well, at 29x forward earnings.34 It is the same pool of engines. An engine that enters Safran’s aftermarket does not enter an Airbus aircraft. A LEAP-1B bolted to a Boeing 737 MAX does not power an A320neo. A spare engine in a Ryanair pool does not clear a glider off the Toulouse apron. The 1,802 headline cannot simultaneously justify Safran’s aftermarket tripling and Airbus’s delivery acceleration. One of those stories is wrong.
Faury reports on February 19. He will cite Safran’s numbers. He will reference the 8,754-aircraft backlog.8 The market will price in whatever number he gives, because the engines are coming.
The engines were coming in 2025 too. Airbus ended the year with negative free cash flow at mid-year, a guidance cut in December, and 19 deliveries in January.
Footnotes
1 Safran FY 2025, 13 Feb 2026. Revenue 31.3B (+14.7%). ROI 5.2B (+26%). FCF 3.92B. LEAP 1,802 (+28% YoY, +49% Q4). 2026 ROI guidance 6.1-6.2B. 2028 targets raised: ROI 7.0-7.5B, cumulative FCF 2024-28 ~21B. Morocco LEAP line (2028), Casablanca LG (280M), Hyderabad MRO. Aftermarket +21%. Investor presentation slides 18-22: “still elevated spare engine ratio,” LEAP aftermarket revenue >3x 2024-2028, LEAP RPFH margin >80% recognized after 2030, 3rd-party MRO share 10% (2024) to 30% (2030) to >50% (2040), propulsion operating margin 22-24% (2025-2028e).
1a Leeham News, 13 Feb 2026. 1,450+ HPT durability kits produced. “Can more than double time on wing in harsh environments.” Andries: intervals now in line with CFM56. Half of LEAP-1A fleet equipped with reverse bleed system.
2 Airbus 188 (13 Feb) to 195 (16 Feb). Per Investing.com.
3 UBS, 12 Feb 2026. Model cut 905 to 880. “Ambitious message to the supply chain.”
4 AerospaceGlobalNews, 28 Dec 2025. Consensus ~900, outliers at 1,000.
5 Boeing FY 2025, 13 Jan 2026. 600 commercial aircraft. 447 737 family.
6 Aviation Week, 15 Jan 2026. 15 C919s delivered in 2025. Target cut from 75 to 25.
7 Safran H1 2025. Ryanair 30 LEAP-1B spare engines.
8 Airbus FY 2025, 12 Jan 2026. 793 aircraft. 607 A320neo-family, 93 A220, 57 A350, 36 A330. Backlog 8,754.
9 Boeing 737 MAX production. Currently 42/month, targeting 53 by end of 2026.
10 FlightGlobal, 7 Nov 2025. Morocco LEAP-1A line: first engine 2028, 350/year by ~2030.
10a Aviation Week, 7 Dec 2024. Safran ramping to 1,200 LEAP shop visits/year, with new MRO facilities in Hyderabad, Queretaro (2025), and Casablanca (2026). Target: 90-day turnaround for heavy LEAP visits.
11 FlightGlobal, 23 Dec 2025. 835 GTF-powered aircraft in storage at end-October 2025. 720 A320neo-family (38% of that fleet). 1,723 in service. Total fleet storage rate 33%. LEAP fleet: 155 stored (3.5%).
12 Cranky Flier / P&W disclosure. Shop visits 250-300 days. See also AeroXplorer.
13 FlightGlobal, Feb 2026. Recovery through end of decade. P&W “still in dialogue” with Airbus on supply.
14 FlightGlobal, Jan 2026. P&W delivered 1,055 large commercial turbofans in 2025 (+6% YoY).
15 Leeham News, 30 Oct 2025. Airbus Q3 2025: 32 gliders remaining. Engine issues “50/50 across engine OEMs.” Faury: engines remain “main areas of attention and concern.”
16 Airbus H1 2025 results, 30 Jul 2025. FCF before customer financing: -1.6B. “High level of produced commercial aircraft awaiting engines.” ~60 gliders.
17 FlightGlobal, 12 Jan 2026. Scherer: engine volume “not the limiting factor” by year-end. Gliders reduced to “manageable” number.
18 Airbus filing, 3 Dec 2025. “Recent supplier quality issue on fuselage panels.” Guidance revised ~820 to ~790.
19 Reuters/Bloomberg via AeroTime. Sofitec Aero, Seville. 628 aircraft: 168 in service, 245 final assembly, 215 earlier production.
20 EASA PAD 25-196, 17 Dec 2025. 177 in-service aircraft. See also AeroTime, IAMA.
21 Supply Chain Magazine, 15 Jan 2026. Scherer: engines “continued to arrive very, very late in 2025.”
22 Dec 2025: 136 aircraft. 17.2% of 793. Per AerospaceGlobalNews.
23 Forecast International, 2 Feb 2026. Aircraft “contractually delivered on December 31st to support year-end performance metrics were physically ferried to their operators throughout January.”
24 Airbus Jan 2026 deliveries. 19 aircraft, 15 customers.
25 AeroTime, 7 Feb 2026. Jan 2019: 39.
26 Dec 2023: 112 of 735 (15.2%). Per Leeham News.
27 Dec 2024: 123 of 766 (16.1%). 2024 guidance: 800 to 770 to 766. Per Euronews.
28 2019: 863 aircraft. 863 / 12 = 71.9/month. Per Airbus.
29 Rate 75 slippage: 2025 to 2026 to 2027. June 2024 Airbus guidance update. “Persistent specific supply chain issues mainly in engines, aerostructures and cabin equipment.”
30 AerospaceGlobalNews, 28 Dec 2025. “Roughly 60.”
31 Forecast International, Jun 2025. “Does not expect [Rate 75] to be met within the company’s projected timeline.”
33 Safran: ~33x 2026E consensus EPS. Per Bloomberg consensus as of 14 Feb 2026.
34 Airbus: ~29x 2026E consensus EPS. Per Bloomberg consensus as of 14 Feb 2026.